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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellee ] 
v s . ] 
BARRY J. SNYDER, ] 
Defendant-Appellant ] 
1 Case No. 920475CA 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of The 
First Judicial District of the State of Utah in and for the County of 
Cache, Honorable Robert W. Daines, presiding, dated, June 22, 1992, 
finding the defendant guilty of two counts of lewdness involving a 
child, two Class A Misdemeanors. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f) (1953 as 
amended). This appeal is taken by the defendant under Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. §77-l-6(g) and 
§78-4-11 (1953 as amended), and pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
1. The Trial Court failed to state its findings on the record in 
sufficient detail to enable the Utah Court of Appeals to adequately 
review the Trial Court fs decision. The issue is a question of law, and 
the s tandard of review is a correction of error s tandard. (See State v . 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. The Trial Court failed to grant the Motion to Suppress on the 
basis the police failed to advised defendant of his r ights as required in 
Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U.S . 436 (1966). The issue is a question of 
law, and the standard of review is a correction of er ror s tandard . 
(See State v . Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. In the alternative, the Trial Court failed to grant relief for 
the defendant's failure to file i t 's motion to suppress timely. The issue 
is a question of law, and the standard of review is an abuse of 
discretion determination. (See State v . Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (UT 
1987). 
4. In the alternative, defendant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional 
r ights in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress which 
prejudiced defendant's r ight to a fair trial and further failed to 
reasser t the Motion to Suppress at critical stages of the proceedings. 
The issue is a question of law, and the standard of review is ffde novo" 
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where the question is whether counsel's performance was deficient in 
some demonstrable manner so as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and there is a reasonable probability 
tha t , but for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding 
would have been more favorable to the defendant. State v . Pascual, 
804 P. 2d 553 (Utah App. 1991); State v . Carter , 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 
1989); Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S . 668 (1984). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO 
HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF MARTY PRESCOTT. 
1. The trial court erred in not granting Defendant's Pre-trial 
Motion to Suppress on the basis of untimely notice of new witnesses for 
tr ial . The standard of review is a "correction of error" s tandard. 
(See State v . Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. The trial court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion to 
Exclude her testimony on the basis of violation of the witness 
exclusionary rule . The standard of review is an abuse of discretion 
determination. (See State v . Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981). 
3. In the alternative, defendant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional 
r ights in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress the 
testimony of Marty Prescott which prejudiced defendant right to a fair 
trial and further failed to reassert the Motion to Suppress at critical 
stages of the proceedings and failed to ensure she was not present 
during critical argument of proper jury instructions which set forth the 
facts and law critical to the case. The standard of review is ftde novo" 
where the question is whether counsel's performance was deficient in 
some demonstrable manner so as to fall below an objective standard of 
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reasonable professional judgment, and there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding 
would have been more favorable to the defendant. State v . Pascual, 
804 P.2d 553 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 
1989); Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
C. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
MOVE TO DISMISS ONE COUNT OF LEWDNESS ON THE 
BASIS OF THE FAILURE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS TO 
IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE IN 
FAILING TO REQUEST THE COURT TO GIVE A 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY. 
The Standard of Review is "de novo" where the question is 
whether counsel's performance was deficient in some demonstrable 
manner so as to fall below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment; and there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding would have 
been more favorable to the defendant. State v . Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Carter, 776 P. 2d 886 (Utah 1989); 
Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also State v . 
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) as to cautionary instruction. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE 
TESTIMONY OF BRIAN J. ORME. 
The Standard of Review is an abuse of discretion determination. 
(See State v . Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981). 
E. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL 
ALLOWING BRIAN J. ORME TO BE PRESENT DURING 
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TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF THE WITNESS EXCLUSORY 
RULE. 
The Standard of Review is "de novo" where the question is 
whether counsel's performance was deficient in some demonstrable 
manner so as to fall below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment; and there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding would have 
been more favorable to the defendant. State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Carter, 776 P. 2d 886 (Utah 1989); 
Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1, 
RELATING TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF 
LEWDNESS; PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3, 
RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF TRESPASS AND 
VOYEURISM AND TRESPASSORY VOYUERISM; PART OF 
PROFFERED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 RELATING TO 
DEFINITION OF EXPOSING; AND PROFFERED JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 DEFINING THE WORDS AFFRONT AND 
ALARM. 
The Standard of Review is discretionary and in the interest of 
justice review. (See State v . Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977); Rule 19, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Issue No. A (1-4): 
a. Amendment V of the United States Constitution reads as 
follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
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or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, l iberty, or proper ty , without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use , without just 
compensation. 
b . Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution reads as 
follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r ight to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the r ights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
c. Amendment VI of the United States Constitution reads as 
follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public tr ial , by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence. 
d. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(b) (c) and (d) 
reads as follows: 
(a) Any defense, objection or request , including request for 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
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determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised 
prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at 
least five days prior to the trial: . . . 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed. . . 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial 
unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial 
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, 
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
Issue No. B (1-3) 
a. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16(a) and (g) reads 
as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge: . . . 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on 
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in 
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. . . 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is 
brought to the attention of the court that a par ty has failed to 
comply with this rule , the court may order such par ty to permit 
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the 
par ty from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
b . Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 (1953 as amended) reads as follows: 
In an action of divorce, criminal conversation, seduction, 
abortion, rape or assault with intent to commit rape , the court 
may, in its discretion, exclude all persons who are not directly 
interested therein, except jurors , witnesses and officers of the 
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court ; and in any cause the court may, in its discretion, dur ing 
the examination of a witness exclude any and all other witnesses 
in the cause. 
c. The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears 
under A. 
d. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution appears under 
A. 
e . Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(b) and (d) 
appears under A. 
f. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30 reads as follows: 
(a) Any e r ro r , defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial r ights of a par ty shall be disregarded. 
Issue No. C: 
a. The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears 
under A. 
b . Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution appears under 
A. 
c. Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution reads in 
par t as follows: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, l iberty, or 
p roper ty , without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
d. Article I , Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah Constitution reads as 
follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, l iberty, or p roper ty , without 
due process of law. 
Issue No. D: 
a. The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears 
under A. 
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b . Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 appears under B. 
Issue No. E: 
a. The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears 
under A. 
b . Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution appears under 
A. 
c. Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 appears under B. 
Issue No. F: 
a. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 19(c) reads as 
follows: 
No par ty may assign as error any portion of the charge or 
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is 
ins t ructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a par ty ' s failure to 
object, e r ror may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a 
manifest injustice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An Information was filed on March 26, 1992, charging the 
defendant with two counts of Lewdness Involving a Child, both Class A 
Misdemeanors, and summons was served on the defendant on March 31, 
992. (R. 57-60). By letter to the court , Raymond N. Malouf, entered 
his appearance on behalf of the defendant, requested the court accept 
the defendant's plea of "not guilty" and that the matter be set for 
tr ial . (R. 55). The matter was set for trial , pursuant to notice of the 
court , for May 21, 1992. (R. 54). On May 15, 1992, defendant, 
through his counsel of record, filed a Motion to Suppress . (R. 44-47). 
The State objected to the Motion. The mailing certificate on the 
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Objection is dated May 18, 1992; no date stamp is on the Objection in 
the court 's file, (R. 42-43). A hearing was held on the Motion to 
Suppress on May 19. (R. 20; T 2) . The court found it would be a 
useless act to hold a hearing on the Motion to Suppress because the 
defendant was given his r ights and that the Motion was not timely. 
(R. 20; T. 27). The defendant was tried by a jury on May 21, 1992, 
and count guilty and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 365 
days in jail and two fines of $740. The jail time and fines were 
suspended if defendant serve 20 days in jail, complete 40 hours of 
community service, complete outpatient counseling with ISAT along with 
other minor terms and conditions. (R. 6 ) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 17, 1992, shortly after school had dismissed for the 
day, three minor children were walking past the Barry Snyder 's home 
in River Heights, Utah, and stopped in front of his house. (T . 76, 
114). The defendant had previously been having trouble with school 
children destroying property or playing practical jokes on him, so he 
stood up to watch the children through a window when his dog star ted 
to ba rk . (T . 181, 185). He had just gotten out of the shower, had 
been sitt ing on the couch, fondling himself, and was naked at the time. 
(T . 181, 213) 
When it appeared to the defendant the minor girls were not 
leaving his p roper ty , he went into the next room and pulled on a pair 
of light colored shor t s , and opened the front door and screen door and 
yelled at the girls to get away from his proper ty . (T . 182-185). 
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Two of the minor girls testified at trial concerning the incident. 
The older girl , Nicolee, age nine, testified she saw a naked man 
standing halfway in and halfway out of the doorway with his penis 
down. (T. 76, 77, 79, 92). She indicated the defendant looked like the 
same guy she saw. (T. 79). The younger girl , Amber, age seven, 
stated she saw a naked person touching his penis , with his penis 
sticking up a little in the air . (T. 115-117). She could not identify 
the individual she saw in the doorway. (T. 119). The defendants 
counsel never made a Motion to Dismiss and never requested a 
cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness testimony. 
On March 18, 1992, two sheriff deputies came to the defendant's 
home in River Heights, Utah, and took him to the Child and Family 
Support Center at 14 North and about Fifth West in Logan. (T. 140-
142). The defendant was not advised he was free to go at any time, 
and because of the insistence of the deputies, he did not believe he 
could leave. (T . 239, 240). Defendant was a Category One police 
officer at the time. (T. 238), 
When the deputies and the defendant arr ived, the investigating 
officer s tated: 
LN: Um, typically in these situations I have to read people their 
r igh t s . I think you know what your r ights a re , probably. 
BS: Oh, yea. 
LN: And understand them. 
BS: Yea. (R. 45) 
The interview with the defendant was then videotaped. (T. 144). 
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The defendant was never read his Miranda r igh t s . In the 
interview he informed the police officers he had been in the shower 
masturbating and continued to masturbate after he got out of the 
shower. (T . 145, 146). He further stated he watched the little kids 
walk by from his front window; and, as he watched them, "he 
visualized other women or things from movies, fantasies that he had 
seen previous to that time." (T. 147). Almost all of defendants 
cross-examination was from statements he made in the custodial 
interrogation. For example, statements to the effect that he wondered 
how far it (masturbation) can go and "What I need to do is find 
something that can curb that masturbation u rge , that ' s the biggest 
problem, that ' s the problem. (T , 257). Similar prejudicial statements 
taken thereafter were used against the defendant at tr ial . (T . 248-
262). 
The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all statements taken in 
the interview and to suppress testimony of all witnesses not previously 
identified by the State. (R. 44-47). The court reviewed the Motion on 
proffers of testimony. (T . 27). It appears the court ruled against the 
defendant on the Motions, although the record is not clear. (T . 27). 
The court did rule that the motions were untimely in that they had not 
been filed more than five days prior to tr ial . (T . 28). 
At the first of the trial , the defendant and the State both 
requested the exclusion of witnesses during the court proceedings. 
(T . 46) . During argument on jury instructions, Marty Prescott , a 
witness for the State, was present in the courtroom (T . 292). Over 
objection, the court allowed her to testify. (T. 292-293). Brian Orme, 
a proposed rebuttal witness of the defendants, was present dur ing some 
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of the afternoon testimony. (T. 273) The court did not allow him to 
testify. (T. 273). 
Counsel for defendant requested specific instructions and 
definitions relating to the elements of the crime of which defendant was 
accused. The court refused to give the instructions. (T . 275-291). 
Following the jury verdict , the defendant, because of his indigent 
s t a tus , requested and was appointed a public defender to assist him in 
pursuing his r ights on appeal. (R. 12). 
A jury found the defendant guilty of Lewdness involving a child, 
two counts, and the defendant was sentenced to serve 20 days in jail, 
to perform 40 hours of community service, to complete an outpatient 
counseling with ISAT, and to pay costs of $350 through Adult Probation 
and Parole. (R. 6 ) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A defendant is entitled to certain constitutional guarantees and 
s tatutory procedural guarantees which afford that he will receive a fair 
and impartial trial with all the safeguards and presumptions given to 
him. 
Mr. Snyder was not afford his constitutional guarantees. Prior to 
the court 's involvement in the matter, Mr. Snyder was taken into 
custodial interrogation and not read his r ights guaranteed to him by the 
United States Constitution and the State Constitution. In part icular , he 
was not told he had the right to remain silent, or that he had the r ight 
to counsel. Incriminating information, used against him in impeachment 
and in direct testimony at trial , was taken from him at that time by a 
means of a videotape. 
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Mr. Snyder was initially led to believe this information would not 
be used against him at tr ial . Shortly before the trial date , he learned 
the t ranscr ipt of the proceeding was going to be used at trial and that 
certain other impeachment witnesses were going to be called. His 
at torney filed a Motion to Suppress . The Motion was not filed prior to 
five days before tr ial . 
The record is not clear whether the trial court ever reached the 
merits of the Motion to Suppress as to the information on the videotape. 
The court did rule the Motion to Suppress was untimely and did not 
include a request to suppress the witnesses. 
Mr. Snyder on appeal argues that ruling was not correct . First 
of all, the findings are not clear, and the record so insufficient that 
the Court on Appeal should remand the case. Secondly, the police 
officers failed to adequately inform Mr. Snyder of his constitutional 
r ights as required in the United States Supreme Court case of Miranda 
v . United States. Thirdly, that even though the filing was late, the 
court in its discretion, in order to protect those very basic 
constitutional r ights of the defendant, should have fully reviewed the 
matter and granted the Motion. Finally, in the alternative, counsel for 
defendant should have timely filed the necessary Motions and the failure 
of counsel to do so renders defendant with ineffective counsel which 
impacted upon the fundamental fairness and due process r ights of the 
defendant to have a fair tr ial . 
The witness defendant sought to have suppressed from testifying 
was Marty Prsecott . Notice of Mrs. Prescott fs testimony was not given 
to counsel for defendant until shortly before tr ial . The court should 
have excluded her testimony, continued the tr ial , or ordered some 
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safeguards to protect the defendant from the surpr i se . The court did 
nothing, and Mrs. Prescott was allowed to testified to the substantial 
harm to defendant. Mrs. Prescott was also present in the courtroom 
when jury instructions were argued and witness testimony discussed. 
The court had previously excluded all witnesses under the exclusionary 
rule . Despite th is , she was allowed to testify. Brian Orme, a witness 
for the defendant was also present during some of the afternoon 
testimony. He was not allowed to testify. The court abused its 
discretion in allowing the State fs witness and not the defendant's 
witness. In the alternative, the counsel for the defendant should have 
more timely filed a Motion to Suppress Mrs. Prescott 's testimony, or 
filed a motion to continue the trial date. Fur ther , he failed to object to 
her testimony during trial and failed to ensure she was not present 
during the critical stages in the proceeding. 
Counsel for the defendant was also ineffective in that he failed to 
ensure that Brian Orme was not present in the courtroom during 
testimony. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that in cases involving 
eyewitness testimony, a cautionary instruction is required to safeguard 
against the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Counsel for defendant 
never requested such an instruction and none was given. This was 
extremely prejudicial to the defendant in that the jury was not informed 
as to the proper weight to give to the eyewitnesses. 
Finally, the court did not adequately explain the necessary 
elements of the crime to which the defendant was charged such that the 
jury could not effectively evaluate his guilt or innocence on the matter. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
1. The Trial Court failed to state its findings on the record in 
sufficient detail to enable the Court of Appeal to adequately review the 
Trial Court fs decision. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v . Marshall, 791 
P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990) has stated that with respect to motions to 
suppress , the trial court is to state its findings on the record. "Those 
findings must be sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the 
opportunity to adequately review the decision below." Id. at 882. 
The opinion of the trial court on this matter is not clear. At one 
point the court indicates that the defendant was given his r ights 
pursuant to Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U.S . 436 (1966), ye t , thereafter , 
appears to base his ruling on the untimeliness of defendant's Motion. 
The failure of the trial court to identify the basis of denial of the 
Motion to Suppress should require this court to remand the case to the 
lower court to re-examine the issue of the lack of the Miranda warning 
and for a new trial . 
2. The Trial Court failed to grant the Motion to Suppress on the 
basis the police failed to advise defendant of his r ights as required in 
Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U .S . 436 (1966). 
Assuming the lower court ruled that the defendant was not 
entitled to the Miranda warning because of his category as a police 
officer at the time of the custodial interrogation, the ruling is contrary 
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to United States and Utah case law and should be reversed and the 
case remanded for a new trial . 
The United State Supreme Court explicitly stated in the Miranda 
case that any person who has been brought in for custodial 
interrogation has the right to be read his constitutional r ights 
guaranteed under the V and VI Amendment of the United State 
Constitution, i . e . their right to silence and their right to counsel. Id. 
at 444. As stated by the Court: 
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of 
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate 
warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will 
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant 
was aware of his r ights without a warning being given. 
Assessment of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on 
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact 
with authorit ies, can never be more than speculation; a warning 
is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of 
the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the 
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to 
insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the 
privilege at that point in time. 
Id. at 468-469. 
The Court, thereafter, went on to hold in regard to the 
defendant's r ight to counsel: 
Accordingly, we hold that an individual held for interrogation 
must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a 
lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation 
under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. 
As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that 
anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this 
warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount 
of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of 
this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a 
warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was 
aware of this r ight . 
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Id. at 472 (emphasis added) . 
Thus , the Miranda case leaves no doubt that the warning should 
and must be given in order to protect the defendant involved. 
Other cases have likewise specifically indicated that the warning 
is appropriate even when a police officer is a defendant. Rothschild v . 
State, 388 F. Supp. 1346 (1974); Peden v . United States, 512 F.2d 1099 
(Ct.Claims 1975); Widomski v . Chief, 397 A.2d 222 (MD 1979). 
The Utah courts have likewise adopted and cited with approval 
the United States Supreme Court case of Miranda. See, for example, 
State v . Mincy, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 1992). 
Barry Snyder was taken from his home by two police officers and 
driven from River Heights to the other end of Logan, Utah. The police 
officers acknowledged to him that he was in a situation where a reading 
of his r ights was required, i . e . "typically in these situations I have to 
read people their r i gh t s . " (R. 45). However, the police thereafter did 
not read Mr. Snyder his r ights in contradiction of the clear language of 
Miranda that the only way to assure and guarantee those r ights to a 
defendant in this situation to actually read to him his full and complete 
r igh t s . This was not done. 
The failure to exclude the material obtained in the taped interview 
was extremely prejudicial to the defendant. Mr. Snyder, because of 
the pressure of the situation and his personal feelings of remorse over 
a habit that may be out-of-control, revealed to the police officers his 
problem with masturbation, sexual fantasies and that he did not know 
where the problem may lead. Was Mr. Snyder thereafter convicted 
because he was actually naked in front of two very young gir ls , or did 
the jury convict him, not because he was guilty beyond a reasonable 
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doubt, but because they felt he had a problem that he needed some 
professional help in solving. A strong possibility that Mr. Snyder was 
convicted because of his sexual fantasies, and not from any act of 
actual lewdness on his pa r t . 
The testimony of Marty Prescott is likewise tainted. Having been 
put in a situation when he was obligated to reveal certain sexual 
problems to his fellow officers, she , as a dispatcher for his employer, 
may have asked him about the revelation. Had the interview with the 
other officers never occurred, the conversation with Marty Prescott 
probably may have also never occurred, (cite fruit of poisonous tree) 
The damming sexual problem he may have would have been properly 
kept from the jury ; and Mr. Snyder, based on the weak evidence of 
the two little gir ls , would have not been convicted. 
"Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were 
ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual l iberty." Miranda, at 
458. Mr. Snyder 's basic r ights have been taken away in this matter, 
and this court should dismiss the counts against him and grant him the 
right to a fair tr ial . 
3. In the alternative, the Trial Court failed to grant relief for 
the defendant's failure to file his motion to suppress timely. 
The lower court ruled that Mr. Snyder 's Motion to Suppress was 
untimely in that it was not filed within the five day time requirement 
set forth in Rule 12(b) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Given the 
s t rong basic constitutional issues involved, defendant submits the court 
abused its discretion in failing to allow him those guarantees set forth 
in the V and VI Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
found in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Fur ther , 
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reasonable excuse existed in that defendant's counsel had barely 
received the written t ranscr ipt , had been led to believe that the 
information was not going to be used, and immediately filed the Motion 
upon learning the information was intended on being used against the 
defendant. 
Rule 12(d) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the lower 
court to grant relief from the time requirement. The lower court 
abused its discretion by not allowing the defendant to fully present his 
Motion and by not granting the same. 
4. In the alternative, defendant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional 
r ights in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress which 
prejudiced defendant's r ight to a fair trial and further failed to 
reasser t the Motion to Suppress at critical stages of the proceedings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently, again, set forth the 
elements a defendant must establish in order to asser t a claim of 
ineffective trial counsel. In State v . Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 
(Utah App. 1992), this court s tated: 
To successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defendant must show that (1) his counsel's performance was 
objectively deficient, and (2) there exists a reasonable probability 
tha t , absent the deficient conduct, the verdict would have been 
more favorable to defendant. 
Id. at 52. 
As in this case, the attorney in Cummins failed to timely file the 
statutory require notice of intention to offer the testimony of a mental 
health exper t . The court found that such a failure established that the 
counsel's performance was deficient. The attorney in this case likewise 
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missed a deadline in filing Mr. Snyder 's Motion to Suppress which the 
lower court specifically found as "untimely". Counsel's performance was 
deficient. See also, State v . Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v . Carter , 776 P. 2d 886 (Utah 1989); and Strickland v . 
Washington, 466 U.S . 668 (1984). Accordingly, the defendant was 
effectively denied his constitutional right to counsel. 
Fur ther , a s t rong, reasonable probability exists that absent the 
failure of Mr. Snyder 's attorney to effective prevent the introduction of 
the evidence at tr ial , Mr. Snyder would have received a favorable 
verdict . Absent the information given to the police, the jury would 
have been left with the conflicting stories of the young gir ls . The 
defendant would not have taken the stand. The conflict would have 
been more pronouced, and "a bet ter chance for acquittal". Id. at 52. 
To be denied the Motion, "may well have impacted upon 'the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged.'" Id. quoting from 
State v . Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Given the failure of his counsel and the s trong probability of a 
different outcome, a reversal and remand should be ordered. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO 
HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF MARTY PRESCOTT. 
1. The Trial Court Erred in not granting Defendants Pre-trial 
Motion to Suppress on the basis of untimely notice of new witnesses for 
tr ial . 
The defendant was not informed of the names of additional 
witnesses and the fact the information taken from him during a custodial 
interrogation with two police officers was going to be used against him 
until a week before tr ial . At that time his attorney filed a Motion to 
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Suppress the information in the interview, and orally at the hearing two 
days before tr ial , also moved that the new witnesses be excluded. The 
court ruled both Motions were untimely made. 
The prosecutor, under this action, had a continuing duty to 
inform the defendant of information and witnesses he intended to 
introduce at tr ial . Pursuant to Rule 16(a)(5), the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defendant "any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made available to the 
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense." Failure to do so could effect the substantial r ights of the 
defendant thus warranting a reversal . See Rule 30, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the prosecutor is under a 
continuing duty to inform the defendant of new witnesses and 
information in order to make the trial one of fairness, a quest for 
t r u t h , and "not simply a contest between the parties to win." State v . 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987) quoting from State v . Carter , 
707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). The failure of the prosecutor to make a 
timely disclosure of evidence "might so mislead defendant as to cause 
prejudicial e r ro r . " Id. 
In this case the prosecutor violated his duties under Rule 16 in 
failing to provide the defendant with the needed t ranscr ip t , leading 
defendant to believe the information would not be used at t r ial , and 
failing to adequately inform defendant of proposed witnesses. 
The failure of the prosecutor to untimely provide this information 
was brought to the court 's attention in the written Motion to Suppress 
filed on May 15, 1992, and at the oral argument on the Motion on May 
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19, 1992. This was done pursuant to Rule 16(g) which provides as 
follows: 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is 
brought to the attention of the court that a par ty has failed to 
comply with this rule , the court may order such par ty to permit 
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the 
par ty from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
The trial court simply denied the defendants motions and did not 
grant any relief to the defendant. Had the information not been 
introduced at trial a reasonable likelihood exists that the outcome of 
Snyder 's trial would have resulted in a dismissal. 
The court in State v . Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) was faced 
with a similar challenge by the defendant that the prosecutor did not 
disclose information to him, including statements and witnesses names 
and addresses , until shortly before tr ial . In reversing the conviction, 
the Utah Supreme Court found there was a "reasonable likelihood" that 
in the absence of such tainted information, a more favorable result 
would have been reached for defendant. Id. at 923. 
Absent the incriminating statements of the defendant and the 
testimony of Marty Prescott , the defendant would have had only the 
conflicting testimony of two gir ls . Fur ther , additional witnesses may 
have been called by the defendant had he had an opportunity to 
prepare for the trial with a reasonable notice of the use of the material 
and the calling of additional witnesses. His pretrial s t ra tegy could 
have been substantially different. Additional matters of impeachment of 
the witnesses may have been discovered and used to discredit the 
testimony had it been admitted. Because the information was 
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fundamental to, the State's case in chief, and because of the fundamental 
unfairness to the defendant and the reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable verdict absence the tardiness of production of the 
information, Mr. Snyder 's conviction requires a reversal . 
2. The Trial Court Erred in not granting Defendant's Motion to 
Exclude Marty Prescott fs testimony on the basis of violation of the 
witness exclusionary rule . 
The court , upon motion of both parties at the first of t r ial , 
excluded all witnesses from the courtroom during the proceedings. 
Marty Prescott was thereafter present in the courtroom during argument 
over jury instruct ions. During the arguments, references were made to 
prior testimony of other witnesses. The purpose of present ing 
untainted witnesses to the jury was thereafter impaired because of the 
newly acquired knowledge of Marty Prescott . Despite her knowledge, 
and despite the court 's previous ruling that all witnesses be excluded 
from the proceedings, the court thereafter, over objection of the 
defendant, allowed her to testify. The court abused its discretion and 
the conviction should be reversed. 
3 . In the alternative, defendant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional 
r ights in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress the 
testimony of Marty Prescott which prejudiced defendant fsf r ight to a 
fair trial and further failed to reassert the Motion to Suppress at 
critical stages of the proceedings and failed to ensure she was not 
present during critical argument of proper jury instructions which set 
forth the facts and law critical to the case. 
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Defense counsel never formally filed a Motion to Suppress the 
testimony of Marty Prescott . The court found at oral argument on the 
Motion to Suppress that the Motion was not broad enough to encompass 
a Motion as to the newly proposed witnesses. The defense counsel did 
not renew his objection to the witness or the introduction of the 
evidence in the tape at the time of trial . Fur ther , defense counsel did 
not request a continuance or make any other request to lessen the 
effect of the testimony and impeachment information. See Rule 16(g) , 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Utah case law indicates that a defendant may waive his right to 
claim error as to the newly produced evidence if he does not request a 
continuance at the time the evidence is produced. State v . Larsen, 775 
P.2d 415 (Utah 1989); State v . Christoff erson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah 
App. 1990). Mr. Snyder 's counsel did not make the request . Without 
request ing the continuance and allowing time for the defense to meet 
the information at the time of trial , Mr. Snyder 's r ight to effective 
counsel was violated. State v . Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. 48 (Utah App. 
1992). A substantial likelihood exists the result would have been 
different. Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed. 
C. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE TO 
DISMISS ONE COUNT OF LEWDNESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FAILURE 
OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST THE COURT TO GIVE A 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY. 
At the trial on the matter, one of the eyewitnesses to the incident 
could not identify the defendant. While the other eyewitness believed 
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the defendant to be the man she saw, her testimony of the position of 
the penis conflicted with her sister 's* Despite the conflicts, defense 
counsel did not request , and the court did not give, a cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction. 
The dissent in State v . Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 62-66 (Utah 1982) 
first strongly urged the Utah Supreme Court to recognize the growing 
volume of articles which established the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification and mistaken testimony. Justice Stewart, in writing the 
dissent s tated: 
The inherent dangers of good faith er ror in eyewitness 
identification are widely recognized. "The vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife 
with instances of mistaken identification." 
Id. at 62, quoting from United States v . Wade, 388 U .S . 218 (1967). 
The dissent went on further to state that even when counsel for 
the defense does not request an effective instruction on eyewitness 
testimony, in some courts they have held that the trial judge should 
give it in order to safely protect the accused. Id. at 64, and cases 
cited therein. 
The dissent of Justice Stewart in State v . Malmrose was adopted 
by the majority in the Utah Supreme Court case of State v . Long, 721 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). In that case the Court thoroughly reviewed the 
problems with eyewitnesses and the empirical studies documenting the 
unreliability of eyewitness testimony. As the court s tated: "The 
studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion that human perception is 
inexact and that human memory is both limited and fallible." Id. at 
488. 
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Although the research and evidence demonstrates the problems 
with eyewitness accounts, juries tend to give them great weight. Id. 
at 490-491. As the Court stated: 
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses 
inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors a re , for the most 
pa r t , unaware of these problems. People simply do not accurately 
understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have 
on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness. 
Id. 
Given the totality of the problem, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that trial courts are to give a cautionary jury instruction whenever 
eyewitness identification is a central issue in the case. Id. at 492. So 
so ruling, the Court s tated: 
Given the great weight jurors are likely to give eyewitness 
testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived flaws in i t , to 
convict a defendant on such evidence without advising the jury of 
the factors that should be considered in evaluating it could well 
deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. 
Mr. Snyder 's r ights to a fair and impartial hearing and due 
process of law under the federal and state constitutions were 
jeopardized by the failure of his counsel to request the court to give 
the cautionary instruction. Obvious conflicts existed in the evidence. 
Without the appropriate instruction, the jury possibility could have 
minimized those conflicts and afforded much greater weight than 
justified. Counsels failure to request the instruction warrants this 
court in finding his performance was objectively deficient. Fur ther , 
along with the other previously mentioned problems, the s t rong 
likelihood that the jurors afforded to much weight to the eyewitness 
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testimony (given the empirical studies listed in State v . Long), a 
reasonable probability. exists that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant. Defendants conviction should be reversed , 
and the case remanded. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE 
TESTIMONY OF BRIAN J. ORME. 
Brian J . Orme was a rebuttal witness of Barry Snyder to combat 
the testimony of the minor girls that Mr. Snyder appeared to be naked 
at the time they allegedly saw him. Brian had observed the defendant 
previously in his yellow shorts and would have testified that it 
appeared to him that Barry appeared naked in those shor t s . He was 
not allowed to testify because he was present during the testimony of 
another witness in violation of the exclusionary rule . 
As indicated previously, the exclusionary rule is a discretionary 
rule with the judge. Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 (1953 as amended). The 
court ordered the exclusion of witnesses at the request of both par t ies . 
However, the court relaxed his order and allowed a State's witness to 
testify even though she had been exposed to previous witness 
information. The court thereafter refused the defense the same 
testimony. The failure prevented the defense from effectively rebut t ing 
the case in chief. The court abused its discretion in allowing the 
State's witness to testify and by thereafter refusing to allow Mr 
Snyder 's witness to testify. State v . Carlsen, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 
1981). This court should reverse the conviction. 
E. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL ALLOWING BRIAN 
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J . ORME TO BE PRESENT DURING TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF THE 
WITNESS EXCLUSORY RULE. 
Counsel for defendant was aware of the order of Judge Daines to 
exclude all witnesses from the courtroom. Counsel for defendant was 
also aware of the necessary rebuttal testimony of Brian J . Orme. 
However, counsel did not inform Mr. Orme of the rule , or have the 
court request him to leave during the testimony of o thers . Again, 
counsel's performance meets the standards of ineffective counsel set 
forth in State v . Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah App. 1992), 
and also in the United States Supreme Court case of Strickland v . 
Washington, 466 U.S . 668 (1984), and the defendant's conviction should 
be reversed. 
F . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANTS PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1, RELATING TO 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF LEWDNESS; PROFFERED JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3, RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF TRESPASS 
AND VOYEURISM AND TRESPASSORY VOYUERISM; PART OF 
PROFFERED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 RELATING TO DEFINITION OF 
EXPOSING; AND PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 DEFINING 
THE WORDS AFFRONT AND ALARM. 
The Utah State legislature set forth the statutory definition of the 
crime of lewdness. As part of that definition, the term "trespassory 
voyeurism, was included. The court did not include the term 
"trespassory voyeurism" in the instruction on the elements of the crime 
or a separate instruction as to what constitutes "trespassory 
voyeurism". The definition would have aided the jury in determining 
the elements of the crime of lewdness. Without the additional 
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information, the jury may have not correctly understood the necessary 
elements of the crime. 
The definition of exposing was likewise not given and the words 
"affront" and "alarm" were not defined. These er rors likewise confused 
the jury on the proper standard and definition necessary to convict the 
defendant. Because of the probability that with the definitions, the 
jury ' s outcome would have been affected, the case should be remanded 
and the proper instructions given. State v . Bell, 563 P.2d 186. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution give the 
citizens of Utah fundamental r igh t s . No longer are defendants allowed 
to be browbeaten, pushed into a corner, entrapped into fatal 
contradictions, and denied counsel. Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U .S . 436, 
443 (1966). Defendants are to be guaranteed certain safeguards, 
including the protection against self-incrimination, and the r ight to 
effective assistance of counsel, through critical stages in the 
proceedings. Along with these fundamental r ights come the r ight to 
due process of law and fairness and justice. 
Defendant, Barry Snyder, was brought to this adversary 
proceedings expecting certain fundamental r ight . He was initially 
denied the r ight to be informed of those r igh t s . He was denied the 
r ight to counsel initially. Later as he approached tr ial , he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel through the Motion stage of the 
proceeding to the giving of jury instructions at the time of t r ial . 
Witnesses which could have assisted his defense were denied to him 
while witnesses from the State were given access to the court 's system. 
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The jury was not informed as to certain elements of the crime with 
which he was charged; and, more importantly, were not instructed as 
to the proper weight to give his accusers . 
In view of the many e r ro r s , it is respectfully submitted and 
requested that the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the decision of 
the trial court and discharge the defendant. At the very least this 
court should allow the defendant to have a trial with the benefit of 
effective counsel and the trial court using correct and proper 
procedures given to all defendants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^ day of October, 1992. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
laxk/v. Malmberg J yP. 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jan P. Malmberg, certify that on the J)Cf day of October, 
1992, I served four copies of the attached appel lants brief upon 
Attorney Jeff R. Burbank, Deputy Cache County Attorney, 110 North 
100 West, Logan, UT 84321, by hand-delivering the same to him at the 
afore-mentioned address . 
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ADDENDUM NOV 61992 
Court 
,oi Appeals 
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT - LOGAN 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
SNYDER, BARRY J 
257 W 600 N 
LOGAN UT 84321 
CASE NO: 
DOB: 
TAPE: 
DATE: 
921000169 
05/09/63 
92-203COUNT: 
06/22/92 
3365 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-9-702.5 LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 740.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 365 DA Susp: 345 DA 
Charge: 76-9-702.5 LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 740.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 365 DA Susp: 345 DA 
PROBATION AGENCIES: 
Agency Name: 
Agency Address: 
Agency Address: 
City/State/Zip: 
Phone: 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
9 5 WEST 100 SOUTH 
#240 
LOGAN UT 84321 
(801) 752-1151 
ACS: 4 0 HR 
ACS 40 HR 
PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS? 
DEF WILL ABIDE BY ALL TERMS & CONDITIONS SET BY AP&P 
SERVE 20 DAYS JAIL - AP&P PROBATION FOR 1 YEAR UPON COMPLETION 
THE COURT WILL CONSIDER SUSPENSION OF BALANCE OF- JAIL -
COMPLETE 4 0 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE- COMPLETE OUTPATIENT COUNSEL 
ING WITH ISAT & PAY COSTS OF $350 THRU AP&P - NO CONTACT WITH 
PERSONS UNDER 18 YRS UNLESS WITH ADULTS - STAY FOR 3 0 DAYS 
CALENDAR: 
SENTENCING 
REVIEW HEARING 
06/22/92 11:00 
07/22/92 06:00 
AM in rm 
PM in rm 
1 with DAINES, ROBERT W. 
1 with HARRIS, BURTON H, 
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SNYDER, BARRY J CASE NO: 921000169 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Sentence: 
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor not present 
ATD: MALMBERG, JAN 
TAPE: 92-203 COUNT: 3365 
Judge: DAINES, ROBERT W. 
REV scheduled for 07/22/92 at 0600 P in room 1 with BHH 
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURTia.v^ a, 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' 
Before you convict the Defendant of the crime of lewdness 
involving a child, you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, al1 of the following elements of that crime: 
1. That the Defendant exposed his genitals or private parts, 
masturbated, engaged in trespassory voyeurism, or performed any 
other act of gross lewdness. 
2. That if the Defendant did any of the things described in 
number 1 above, that the act was under circumstances which he 
should know would likely cause affront or alarm to someone else. 
3. That if any- thing described in number 1 above was 
performed in circumstances where the Defendant should know it would 
likely cause affront or alarm (as described in number 2 above) that 
the thing done was done in the presence of another who was under 14 
years of age. 
4. That the event occurred in Cache County, State of Utah, 
on March 17, 1992. 
If you believe the evidence fails to establish anyone or more 
of the foregoing essential elements of the offense, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the Defendant "Not 
Guilty". On the other hand, if the evidence establishes each and 
every one of the foregoing essential elements, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the Defendant "Guilty". 
J i • ! i ! 
U.C.A. Sect ion 76-9-702.5 ^ / 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the phrase "in the presence of 
another" refers to the state or fact of being in the space 
immediately surrounding a person. 
You are further instructed that the word "immediately" means 
with no intervening space or object; and the word "immediate" means 
without an intervening interval. 
Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary 791, 484 (1990), 
c:snyji6.rtd 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. § 'P 
You are instructed that the word "trespass" means to enter 
someone's property unlawfully. 
You are instructed that the word "voyeurism" is conduct 
wherein one finds sexual pleasure in looking at r>ex acts, genital 
organs, etc. 
You are instructed that the phrase "trespassory voyeurism" 
means entering onto someone's property unlawfully to derive sexual 
pleasure in looking at sex acts, genital organs, etc. 
Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary 1052, 1104 (1990) 
A" ^ 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO 
You are instructed that the word "expose" is defined as "to 
deprive of shelter, protection, or care . . . to lay open to view, 
to lay bare." 
You are further instructed that the phrase "exposes his or her 
genitals or private parts" ••—^—B-=H*~9-HF0£-T-5- is limited to 
instances involving at least partial nudity. 
YooTliTirT^ conduct whic. '—""^-^Hfects 
public attention to one'~ ^<^-tSTs o r p r i v at^"^»Pts,,^s^ot an 
exposur<*^MrVoXKt\\& meaning of this law 
c:8nyji2-rt(1 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1 INSTRUCTION NO. _ _ ^ _ _ 
You are instructed that the word "affront" means "to insult, 
especially to the face by behavior or language." 
You are instructed that the word "alarm means "a sudden sharp 
apprehension and fear resulting from the perception of imminent 
danger." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 62; 68 (1983). 
c:snyji7.rtd 
